Security and data protection
How Codexta protects merchant and shopper data: encryption, backups, separation of test and production, limits on staff access, and how this maps to Shopify's protected customer data requirements. Last updated 14 November 2026.
1. Encryption
| Item | Status | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Traffic to the public host | In place | HTTPS with TLS 1.2 and 1.3 and HSTS; plain HTTP is redirected; certificates are issued and renewed automatically. |
| Traffic from Codexta to model providers and Shopify | In place for the named providers | Requests to the model providers listed on the subprocessors page and to Shopify use HTTPS. |
| Platform tokens and shop credentials at rest | In place | Stored encrypted with AES-256 and an integrity check. |
| Key handling for those secrets | Partial | In database mode the key is supplied from outside the database. A written key rotation procedure is not yet documented. Where the key is held is not published. |
| Conversation text, notes and tickets at rest | Not evidenced | Stored as ordinary database content; protection is the database and disk layer below. |
| Database encryption at rest | Not evidenced | The production database is PostgreSQL on AWS. TLS in transit and encrypted secrets are in place; encryption at rest of the database and backups is being verified. |
| Disk and volume encryption | Not evidenced | Being verified. Nothing is claimed until it is confirmed. |
| Backup encryption | Not evidenced | Backups exist on AWS. See backups below. |
2. Backups
Production backups are kept on AWS. Deleted data can remain in backups until they expire. Backup schedule, retention and encryption details are available to merchants on request at codexta@codecta.com. Nothing further is claimed on this page.
3. Test and production separation
In the product:
- Test-only secrets and local-network switches are loaded only in local development. A host in any other environment that carries them refuses to start.
- A conversation started in test mode (for example while authoring) runs tools in test mode. Shop tools report that they are not run against a shop, and authored endpoints on a branch use a separate record namespace.
- Local fake shops and helpdesk apps are used instead of real shops in tests.
- Custom tenant code is off outside development unless explicitly accepted at startup.
Not evidenced: that production and test run on separate infrastructure, databases and credentials, and that no production customer data is copied into test.
4. Limiting staff access to customer data
Codexta staff
- Conversations appear with emails and phone-like numbers hidden. Search runs over the hidden text only.
- Seeing the unmasked transcript is a separate action that writes an audit row first: no row, no reveal.
- Working inside a shop requires a written reason, is limited to one shop and one named staff member, expires after 60 minutes and can be revoked. The audit row records who and why.
- Staff audit rows are append-only, and the merchant can read the rows for its own shop in Settings › Team.
- Conversations started by a merchant's own team with the back-office assistant are private to their author, and visible only to the shop's owner or admin for their own chats.
- Staff sign in with a password. A mandatory second factor for every staff account is not claimed.
Merchant staff
Roles are Owner, Admin, KB editor, Support manager, Support agent and Viewer; the API refuses what the role may not do. The back-office assistant is not offered to shoppers, and its two changing actions (a customer note or tag, a price) run only after the merchant approves the exact change.
Customer data lookups and the model
- Customer data access log: each lookup of a customer or an order by a member of the merchant's team through the back-office assistant is recorded (which staff member, which customer or order, and when), never the returned data. Owners and admins read it in Settings › Team. It is kept for 12 months and a monthly review is recommended.
- Tool results from the back-office assistant (customer name, email, phone, addresses) are sent to the model provider as written, not masked. See Subprocessors.
5. Passwords
Shopify merchants sign in through Shopify; Codexta holds no password for them. Codexta's own accounts (Codexta staff and any non-Shopify login) require a confirmed email. The password policy for those accounts does not yet meet a strong-password requirement.
6. Data loss prevention that exists
- Credentials are never logged or shown; error text is scrubbed of credential values and token-like strings.
- Stored report text and the unanswered-question record hide emails and phone-like numbers.
- Processed webhook bodies and headers are blanked, and the rows are pruned after 30 days.
- Conversations are deleted nightly by plan retention of 30, 60, 90 or 365 days (see the DPA).
- Shopify erasure is automated: customer redaction requests, shop redaction requests, and an uninstalled shop is purged after 48 hours.
- Tenant isolation: every record is filtered by tenant, and tenant data is separated by tenant id in every query. Row-level security is not claimed.
- Per-IP and per-tenant rate limits on the API and on guest sessions.
- Proxy and application logs are kept centrally for one month, with alerting.
- Downloads expire after 14 days.
- Webhook and install signatures are verified before use.
Not claimed: an alert on bulk reads of customer data.
7. Shopify protected customer data requirements and evidence
In place = evidenced. Partial = exists in part or is pending. Gap = not present or not evidenced.
Level 1
| # | Requirement | Status | Evidence and what is open |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Process only the minimum personal data needed | Partial | Shop tools read named fields only, and order attributions keep an id, a total and a time. The app requests broad access scopes and allows read-only queries beyond the dedicated tools, so each scope is still to be reviewed against a use. |
| 2 | Tell merchants what is processed and why | In place | The published privacy policy (updated 14 November 2026), the Data Processing Agreement, the subprocessors page and the Shopify docs privacy section. |
| 3 | Limit use to the stated purposes | Partial | Back-office tools are offered only to the merchant view, per role; data is not used for advertising or sold. There is no technical control that stops a purpose change; it is policy only. |
| 4 | Consent / lawful basis for the shopper | Partial | The chat window shows an AI notice with a Privacy link that cannot be removed. The merchant is controller and owns consent; Codexta captures no consent itself. |
| 5 | Opt-out of data sharing | Partial | Codexta does not sell or share data beyond its processors. There is no opt-out of model processing: conversation text always goes to the language-model provider, and a shopper who does not want that should not use the chat. The shopper can delete their own chats with the Delete my chats option, and the merchant can switch the assistant off for its shop. |
| 6 | Disclose automated decision making | Partial | Codexta does no profiling and makes no legally significant automated decisions. The assistant does not approve returns or refunds itself; the shop approves or declines in its own admin, and the assistant changes prices or notes only after merchant confirmation. Return requests include an automated eligibility check, and the chat window tells shoppers that an AI assistant is in use. |
| 7 | Data processing agreements | Partial | The DPA and subprocessors pages are published. OpenAI's Data Processing Addendum applies and AWS's standard data processing terms apply. DeepSeek is engaged under its standard commercial terms only; transfer safeguards beyond those terms are not claimed. |
| 8 | Retention periods | In place | Plan-based nightly purge, webhook bodies blanked and pruned, 48-hour purge after uninstall, and automated customer and shop redaction. Order attributions are kept while the shop is active, the staff audit log is kept as an append-only record, and backup retention details are available on request. |
| 9 | Encryption of data at rest and in transit | Partial | In transit: in place. Stored secrets: in place. Database, disk and backups at rest: not evidenced (sections 1 and 2). |
Level 2
| # | Requirement | Status | Evidence and what is open |
|---|---|---|---|
| 10 | Encrypted backups | Gap | Encryption of backups is not evidenced; details are available on request (section 2). |
| 11 | Test and production separated | Partial | Startup guard, test mode and fake shops (section 3). Separation of infrastructure is not evidenced. |
| 12 | Data loss prevention | Partial | Masking, scrubbing, retention, rate limits and tenant isolation (section 6). Automated alerting on unusual data access is not yet in place. |
| 13 | Limit staff access to customer data | Partial | Masked views, audited reveal, 60-minute shop access with a written reason, append-only audit (section 4). A mandatory second factor for every staff account is not claimed. |
| 14 | Strong passwords | Gap | Shopify merchants use Shopify sign-in. The password policy for Codexta's own accounts does not yet meet this requirement (section 5). |
| 15 | Log access to customer data | In place | Staff audit for Codexta staff, visible to the merchant, and the customer data access log of the merchant's own team (Settings › Team, owners and admins, kept 12 months). |
| 16 | Incident response policy | Partial | Published Security incident response policy. The incident lead (Amel Music), the deputy (Emir Causevic) and the out-of-hours contact are named, and the Shopify route is defined. A tabletop exercise is planned at least yearly; a completed exercise is not claimed. |
Count: in place 3 (items 2, 8, 15), partial 11, gap 2 (items 10, 14).